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1. Introduction 
 
Over the last century, the frequency of natural disasters has increased significantly, as illustrated 
in Figure 1, with respect to droughts, extreme temperatures, floods, landslides and storm. While 
only four major hydrometeorological hazards were recorded in the first decade of the 20th century, 
the number of hazards rose to 3,362 in the first decade of the 21st century, demonstrating a dramatic 
increase, also partly due to improvements in record keeping over time. The causes of these hazards 
are complex, but there is widespread consensus in the scientific community that anthropogenic 
climate change has led to an increase of temperatures of oceans and the atmosphere, which in turn 
has contributed to the frequency and severity of extreme weather events.1 
Figure 1: Number of weather-related catastrophes 1900-2017 
 
Source: Compiled with data from EM-DAT (2018). Note: The count includes events that meet at least one of the 
following criteria: (i) 10 or more people reported as dead, (ii) 100 people reported as affected, (iii) a declaration of a 
state of emergency, or (iv) a call for international assistance. 
 
 
The natural question that arises from the foregoing discussion is how these weather-related 
catastrophes translate into economic costs.        Existing literature suggests that the occurrence of 
 
1This argument is consistent with the findings of a new report by the Energy and Climate Intelligence Unit (ECIU, 
2017), which shows that climate change is increasing the risk of extreme weather events, including droughts, flooding 
and heatwaves. See also IPCC (2014) and Fischer and Knutti (2015). 
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 climate-related natural disasters is predicted to rise as temperatures increase,  with the prospect  
of significant negative effects on economic growth (Mei et al. (2015); Mendelsohn et al. (2015); 
Felbermayr and Groschl (2014); Alano and Lee (2016); Ferreira and Karali (2015)). Indeed, Fig- 
ure 2 shows the increase in economic losses due to major weather-related events over the last five 
decades. 
Figure 2: Total insured and uninsured losses due to catastrophic weather events 
 
Source: Swiss Re 
 
 
Table 1 presents average annual weather related human fatalities and economic losses 1997- 
2016 for a selection of members of the V20 climate vulnerable forum2.  The five measures are  
the Climate Risk Indicator (CRI) score published by Germanwatch, deaths, deaths per 100,000 
inhabitants,  losses in USD million adjusted for purchasing power parity (PPP), and this figure  
as a percent of PPP GDP. The table as a whole is ranked by CRI score, which is based on the 
other measures shown. The lower the CRI score, the higher a country’s level of exposure and 

















2The Climate Vulnerable Forcum (CVF) was established in 2009 as an “International partnership of countries 
highly vulnerable to a warming planet”. The original membership of twenty expanded to 49 countries by 2018. 
 
3 
 Table 1: V20 average annual weather related human fatalities and economic losses 1997-2016 
 
Country CRI Deaths Deaths 100k Losses in $mil GDP loss % 
 Score Avg Rank Avg Rank Avg Rank Avg Rank 
Honduras 12.2 302 14 4.28 2 561.11 31 1.97 12 
Haiti 13.5 280 15 2.96 5 418.77 36 2.73 10 
Philippines 20.2 860 7 .98 18 2,893.41 8 .61 35 
Bangladesh 26.5 642 9 .44 38 2,311.07 10 .68 32 
Vietnam 31.8 313 13 .37 44 2,029.80 14 .55 38 
Dominican Republic 34.0 211 19 2.32 7 243.53 53 .26 59 
Guatemala 34.3 98 30 .72 26 402.88 40 .44 42 
Fiji 37.8 8 90 .97 19 119.48 77 1.97 11 
Madagascar 37.8 79 36 .41 39 196.41 61 .74 26 
Cambodia 38.0 54 44 .40 41 242.69 54 .80 24 
Grenada 41.0 2 132 1.93 9 78.54 90 7.47 3 
Afghanistan 44.2 280 15 1.01 16 100.29 84 .23 67 
Nepal 45.8 228 18 .88 20 108.59 81 .22 68 
Vanuatu 55.5 2 137 .74 24 15.85 132 2.96 8 
Kenya 56.0 57 40 .16 76 354.7 44 .36 50 
Sri Lanka 59.3 49 46 .25 61 315.62 46 .20 71 
Colombia 59.5 107 27 .25 63 609.13 30 .13 87 
Saint Lucia 61.0 1 144 .67 28 17.78 130 .98 18 
Mongolia 66.8 8 93 .29 57 80.22 88 .32 53 
Papua New Guinea 67.7 24 66 .39 42 36.83 110 .20 73 
Ethiopia 69.7 91 31 .12 92 180.61 65 .21 69 
Gambia 75.5 5 105 .32 49 7.25 146 .33 52 
Samoa 76.3 0 156 .25 62 8.60 144 1 17 
Yemen 77.0 41 52 .19 73 113.95 78 .12 93 
Niger 77.2 15 72 .11 97 47.02 101 .38 48 
Malawi 78.8 11 76 .08 111 61.80 95 .50 40 
Sudan 94.0 47 48 .13 85 82.76 86 .06 130 
Costa Rica 95.0 6 96 .14 82 50.39 98 .09 106 
Bhutan 95.5 2 137 .25 60 5.01 154 .15 81 
Burkina Faso 98.0 8 92 .05 125 40.17 106 .20 70 
Morocco 98.0 17 70 .06 124 172.14 66 .10 102 
Ghana 103.0 30 62 .14 84 32.13 114 .05 137 
Tanzania 104.2 25 65 .06 116 61.72 96 .07 116 
Kiribati 112.0 0 174 0 174 10.61 140 6.6 5 
Marshall Islands 112.2 0 174 0 174 9.02 143 6.66 4 
South Sudan 113.5 11 80 .10 102 16.58 131 .05 133 
Tuvalu 114.2 0 174 0 174 2.63 161 8.5 1 
Rwanda 118.5 11 78 .12 91 3.26 157 .03 147 
Comoros 119.3 1 147 .16 78 .68 171 .07 121 
Tunisia 122.5 4 115 .04 145 64.15 94 .07 118 
Senegal 126.7 5 103 .04 138 15.40 133 .06 124 
Lebanon 127.0 2 129 .06 122 27.27 117 .05 136 
Congo, Democratic Rep. of 131.0 33 58 .05 130 5.74 150 .02 159 
Barbados 142.7 0 173 .02 161 3.70 155 .10 103 
Palau 167.2 0 174 0 174 .06 181 .02 150 
Maldives 169.2 0 1744 0 174 .56 173 .01 160 
Timor-Leste 171.5 0 171 .01 170 .25 176 0 171 
Source: Climate Risk Index (CRI), Germanwatch. Note: Ranked out of 182. Losses in USD purchasing power parity 
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According to the rankings, the countries in the table are not always ranked the highest: Clearly, 
many climate vulnerable countries sit outside the V20 forum. For example, using the average GDP 
loss percentage, the highest in ranking amongst the V20 are Tuvalu (1), Grenada (3), Marshall 
Islands (4), Kiribati (5), Vanuatu (8), Haiti (10), Fiji (11), Honduras (12) - seven of which are 
small island states. When the countries are ranked by losses in USD million, only the Philippines 
(8), Bangladesh (10) and Vietnam (14) are ranked in the highest 20; the rankings of the rest of the 
sample countries are below this. Larger more developed countries are subject to higher nominal 
dollar losses. 
As discussed in the literature review below, and highlighted by Gerling (2017), although re- 
search into the long term economic costs of both climate change and disasters is abundant, the 
body of knowledge is altogether inconclusive. In addition, work on the fiscal impacts of climate 
change is less well developed. The most critical missing link, however, is the dearth of research 
that investigates the effect of climate vulnerability on the cost of sovereign debt. This is an im- 
portant gap in knowledge mainly because the cost at which governments can access finance does 
not only affect the public budget and the government’s ability to invest in climate mitigation and 
adaptation, but it also constrains possible investments in areas such as infrastructure, education 
and public health, and has ramifications for investments undertaken by the private sector. In fact, 
there is likely to be a wide range of spillover effects. Moreover, while existing empirical work 
shows that the most critical variable affecting the Weighted Average Cost of Capital - which is     
a crucial variable for investment appraisal - is the sovereign risk score assigned to each country 
(Ameli et al., 2017), there is no evidence on the relationship between climate impacts, risks and 
vulnerability, and the cost of sovereign debt. For clarity, we define climate impacts as the phys- 
ical manifestations of man-man climate change, for example increased frequency of floods and 
droughts. Climate vulnerability combines both sensitivity to climate change, as well as capacity 
to absorb and adapt to climate change. Climate risks includes the negative financial outcomes 
attributable to anthropogenic climate change.  The later is multidimensional, spanning   transition 
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costs as society switches to electric vehicles, to physical risks such as loss of fisheries as ocean 
temperatures change. 
This paper seeks to address the existing gap in knowledge by investigating a subset of climate 
risk, the impact of climate vulnerability on sovereign bond yields. We use a panel ordinary least 
squares (POLS) methodology to estimate a linear model that attempts to explain sovereign bond 
yields using a set of control variables, climate vulnerability and social preparedness measures. We 
also invoke principal component analysis in order to address the inherent multicollinearity between 
a set of climate vulnerability measures. We find a positive and statistically significant coefficient on 
climate vulnerability, and a negative and statistically significant coefficient on social preparedness. 
The climate vulnerability variable includes structural weaknesses such as dependency on imported 
energy and food that clearly implies higher sensitivity to climate change. The social preparedness 
variable includes measures such as education and Internet access that are effectively non-GDP 
measures of development and infrastructure. 
In addition, the empirical results of our base model generate an estimate of 12.4% as the aver- 
age linear debt cost prediction for a V20 country, based on control variables such as debt to GDP 
and government revenue and expenditure. Our results show that climate vulnerability, as measured 
by the Notre-Dame Global Adaptation Initiative (ND-GAIN) sub-indices for climate sensitivity 
and capacity, increases debt costs by 1.17 percentage points. This is the average partial impact of 
climate vulnerability on V20 countries’ cost of debt. This increase can be partially offset by in- 
vestments in social and physical infrastructure, which according to our empirical estimates reduces 
the cost of debt by an average of 0.67%. The coefficient on this preparedness index suggests that 
investments (that do not necessarily depend on GDP) can mitigate higher debt costs arising from 
higher climate vulnerability. Multiplying this incremental cost (adjusted for average V20 climate 
vulnerability) and historic external public and private debt for the V20 group of climate vulnerable 
countries implies a USD 62 billion higher cost of debt over the last ten years. We consider this a 
lower bound based on direct effects, for a subset of climate vulnerabilities, for a subset of countries 
with poor access to finance. 
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The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature. Section 3 ad- 
dresses the data underlying this study and is complimented by a table of the variables in Appendix 
A. Section 4 explains the methodology underlying our empirical model. Section 5 provides some 
descriptive analysis while the empirical results are presented in Section 6. Section 7 offers some 
comments on our climate vulnerability cost estimate. We provide a variety of robustness checks 
in Section 8. Section 9 discusses selection bias that arises from being dependent on bond yield 
data reported by Bloomberg, and the relationship between this bias and our climate vulnerability 
measure. We close with a short conclusion. 
 
2. Brief literature review 
 
Existing literature summarizes the science behind climate change, links it to physical risks and 
connects this to the functioning of the global economy (see, for example, Farid et al. (2016)). As 
illustrated in Figure 2, costs from catastrophic weather events are rising. However, the research 
relating to the economic growth effects of climate change is not so clear-cut. For example, Cavallo 
et al. (2013) use a combined case study framework, with synthetic controls, and finds that only 
large disasters impact growth and even the observed impact may be caused by subsequent political 
changes rather than the disasters themselves. However, Fomby et al. (2013) find that while the 
results for droughts and floods are statistically significant, only the results for floods show a positive 
cumulative impact on economic growth. These findings are consistent with an earlier finding by 
Raddatz (2007) that climate shocks can only explain a small portion of the output variance of low 
income countries. 
Notwithstanding the above evidence, a selection of papers find a negative impact on economic 
growth. Loayza et al. (2012) attempt to reconcile contradictory studies by delving deeper into 
individual economic sectors. Cabezon et al. (2015) use a panel VAR model and finds an 0.7% 
reduction in trend growth in a group of Pacific islands due to natural disasters. Alano and Lee 
(2016) estimate empirically the link between typhoon wind speed and economic losses in Asia. 
It is with Gerling (2017) that the literature begins to examine differences in loss   dimensions. 
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The paper uses a panel-VARX specification with an exogenous disaster dummy and four endoge- 
nous variables (real GDP per capita growth, primary balance, tax revenue and expenditures). The 
author notes that material damages, people affected and the number of casualties are poorly cor- 
related. Each dimension triggers different macro-fiscal responses. The studies summarized above 
struggle to answer whether the initial direct costs are compounded by reconstruction efforts crowd- 
ing out productive capital expenditures, or completely offset by accelerated Schumpeterian creative 
destruction. Gerling also points out that most studies focus on the economic impact, only a few 
examine the fiscal performance. 
The significance of fiscal effects are difficult to confirm. Acevedo (2014)’s VAR model finds 
that public debt increases following major floods, but this only applies to a subset of the storms they 
study. Cabezon et al. (2015) uses a panel VAR model to detect a worsening of the fiscal balance 
(solely in the first year) for small pacific island states. Melecky and Raddatz (2011) also uses a 
panel VAR framework and discover that on average budget deficits increase only after climatic 
disasters, but for lower-middle income countries the increase in deficits occurs across all types of 
events. Their vector of endogenous variables includes the log of real government expenditures, 
GDP per capita in constant 2000 US dollars, the inflation rate and government revenues. The 
authors build on Melecky and Raddatz (2014) and find that countries with more sophisticated debt 
markets suffer smaller real consequences from disasters but that their deficits expand further. 
In Glass et al. (2015), Standard and Poor’s points out that it is rare for the debt of a country to 
be downgraded due to a natural disaster. Grenada in 2004, following Hurricane Ivan, is given as 
one of these exceptional situations. However they point out that a major reason for this is that often 
the countries most affected do not have a sovereign rating at the date of the catastrophe. Glass et al. 
(2015, page 4) conclude: ’We believe that sovereigns most vulnerable to natural hazards are likely 
to be small island states with next to no geographical diversification and a narrow economic base’ 
The reviewed literature suggests inconclusive evidence that risky weather events harms eco- 
nomic growth, but becomes clearer with respect to the substantial associated costs. While there is 
also considerable research in the linked fields of insurance, catastrophe bonds and risk mitigation, 
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there is also relatively little literature on whether risky weather events may trigger a change in 
ratings, for example a downgrade by rating agencies. There is scant evidence on the mediator / 
moderator variable that is cost of debt, as it relates to climate risk and vulnerability, and climate 
related catastrophes, and how climate vulnerability may be increasing this cost of debt capital. An 
example is the PhD thesis by Ozcan (2005), which follows an event study methodology. We look 
to add to the literature an empirical analysis, focused on climate vulnerability and the cost of debt. 
The hypothesis that we test is does climate vulnerability and social preparedness impact cost of 
debt? The set of controls chosen cover the majority of those mentioned in the prior literature. 
 
3. Data and variables 
 
The data for YIELD is based on weekly bond yield data collected from Bloomberg. This 
includes marketable debt for 17 of the V20 group of climate vulnerable countries: Bangladesh, 
Burkina Faso, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ghana, Guatemala, Kenya, Lebanon, 
Mongolia, Morocco, Philippines, Rwanda, Senegal, Tanzania, Tunisia, and Vietnam. In addition, 
we use annual multilateral bond yield observations, recorded by the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), on eight V20 countries: Ethiopia, Fiji, Honduras, Malawi, Maldives, Nepal, Papua New 
Guinea and Vanuatu. This IMF debt category is typically at concessional rates contracted via 
multilateral or bilateral agreements. Estimation of our model is conducted with and without an 
IMF dummy in order to isolate this effect. We have also assembled data on 21 countries outside 
the V20: the 7 countries of the G7 Group of advanced economies, and for 14 other middle to less 
developed countries. The majority of the bond yield data is for 10 year benchmark rates, however 
this is not the case for all of them. For example, the Burkina Faso data is the average yield from 5 
year government bond auctions, whereas for Guatemala it is a benchmark weekly yield on 20 year 
government debt. We select benchmark debt time series according to the longest period of time 
available. Local currency benchmarks are preferred over foreign currency bonds. Multilateral debt 
is usually denominated in USD or IMF special drawing rights. A list of all countries included in 
the emprical model can be seen in Appendix C. 
10  
Our control data is sourced primarily from the IMF. The per capita income variable (PCY) 
refers to GDP per capita at purchasing power parity in US dollars. DEBT is gross government 
debt to GDP. REV is government revenue to GDP. EXP is government expenditure to GDP. PBA 
is the government’s primary balance to GDP. CPI is inflation as measured by end of period con- 
sumer price indices. The FDI variable comes from the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD), and is normalized relative to GDP. 
The three main dummies of the model are: (i) V20, representing the climate vulnerable coun- 
tries of the V20 Group; (ii) G7, reflecting the seven major economies of the G7; and (iii) IMF, 
representing V20 bond yield observations linked to multilateral debt, and recorded by the IMF. 
The climate vulnerability and readiness data is from the Notre Dame Global Adaptation Index 
(ND-GAIN), which brings together 74 variables to form 45 core indicators to measure sensitivity 
and readiness of over 180 countries. As alluded to by the word adaptation, the headline index is a 
measure of how countries are dealing with the risks they face - the highest ranked country in 2017 
was Norway. Changes to a country’s headline index is a respected measure of that country’s efforts 
at addressing climate risk.   We  focus in on three sub-indices that reflect micro level measures   
of vulnerability and preparedness:  (i) NDS is a sensitivity index that incorporates factors such  
as food import dependency, slum population and dependency on imported energy; (ii) NDC is a 
capacity index based on components such as child malnutrition, access to reliable drinking water 
and electricity access; (iii) NDSR is a social readiness index based on measures such as social 
inequality, ICT infrastructure, and education. ND-GAIN constructs its sub-indices by scaling each 
variable to a 0 to 1 score relative to a benchmark level. What we exclude is as relevant as what 
we include. We have chosen to leave out the ND-GAIN exposure component as it is based on 
projections of climate change rather than actual data, and the ND-GAIN economic readiness index 
which is based on the World Bank’s Doing Business Index. A table of all the variables can be 
found in Appendix A. 
Additionally, we check our results with the Climate Risks Indicator (CRI) provided by Ger- 
manwatch;    and agricultural value added as a proportion of GDP, as reported by the World Bank 
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(not shown). We also considered other indices such as the World Risk Index for our analysis. Un- 
fortunately many of these indices are available only for relatively short time spans. A further issue 
is that purely physical climate indices are poorly suited to our methodology, as they show little 
variation over time, which means they cannot explain observed variation in our dependent vari- 
able. Using actual weather events (as captured, for instance, in the EM-DAT Emergency Events 
Database) is also problematic because it is the losses that count. Put simply, weather events in 
areas with little economic activity cannot be expected to have much impact on the economy and 
hence bond yields. Including country level data on economic losses due to climate-related weather 
events in our econometric analysis would have been desirable, but was not possible due to data 
limitations. This may be a direction for future research. 
For the estimation of historic incremental debt costs, due to climate vulnerability, we use total 
external debt stocks from the World Bank Development Indicator Databank, with the series code 
DT.DOD.DECT.CD (downloaded 30 March 2018). It is defined as debt owed to non-residents 
repayable in currency, goods, or services. Total external debt is the sum of public, publicly guar- 
anteed, and private non-guaranteed long-term debt, use of IMF credit, and short-term debt. Short- 
term debt includes all debt having an original maturity of one year or less and interest in arrears on 




The weekly bond observations are converted into annual figures in order to perform a panel 
ordinary least squares analysis (POLS): 
 
yt = α + βxt + γzt + Et (1) 
Where β is a k × 1 coefficient vector, xt  is a k × 1 vector of climate-related variables, γ is a     
p × 1 coefficient vector, zt is a p × 1 vector of controls. Although α is a k × 1 vector, all the 
intercepts are assumed to be identical within this framework.       This feature is discussed further 
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below. The dependent variable yt are country bond yields. Subscript t is the year. We conduct 
multiple regressions to test the significance of the set of climate variables and controls. 






θi Di + β
Txit + γ
Tzit + Eit (2) 
i 
 
Unfortunately, because some countries had very few usable annual datapoints, such a frame- 
work risked over-specifying the model. In addition, other variables mimic country effects due to 
their low variability over time. 
Our model is a linear regression model and hence all the standard assumptions apply (OLS 
assumptions of linearity, spherical error terms, exogeneity). A linear prediction of base cost of debt 
for the average V20 country, climate vulnerability and social preparedness is estimated by taking 
conditional expected values of the dependent variable. Mechanically this multiplies the coefficients 
estimated by the model with the variables themselves. We can then observe the mean, median and 
standard deviation values for members of the V20 group of climate vulnerable countries. The base 
effect is the predicted cost of debt minus the partial climate vulnerability and social preparedness 
effects. 
Essentially, the average of the V20 sub-sample of explanatory variables is used to derive esti- 
mates of climate vulnerability cost. Further, we assume that parameters are constant, i.e. the partial 
impact of climate vulnerability on cost of debt does not change over time. Specifically, our model 
only identifies the direct effect of climate vulnerability on cost of debt; indirect effects through 
macroeconomic variables are not modeled. For example, we do not capture interventions such as 
IMF support, which is assumed to be exogenous, i.e. independent from climate vulnerability. 
 
5. Descriptive analysis 
 
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for all countries. Table 3 focuses on the V20 countries. 
Government bond yields are higher in V20 countries on average, and there is a considerable gap in 
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GDP per capita, government revenues and expenditures. The mean of the CPI indicator is clearly 
highly skewed by extreme observations for both groups. 
Table 2:  Descriptive statistics: All countries 
 
 
 N Mean St Dev P25 P50 P75 
YIELD 473 7.468 6.028 3.760 5.820 9.540 
NDS 3762 0.403 0.098 0.332 0.396 0.477 
NDC 3960 0.513 0.170 0.390 0.493 0.653 
NDSR 4048 0.308 0.161 0.194 0.257 0.376 
PCY 6351 8350 13659 798 2589 9505 
DEBT 4104 57.256 49.904 28.400 46.250 71.250 
REV 4292 29.236 13.463 18.577 26.981 38.076 
EXP 4268 31.734 14.058 20.985 29.676 40.628 
PBA 4065 -0.011 7.031 -2.327 -0.214 2.092 
CPI 5892 35.623 359.970 2.000 4.800 10.500 
FDI 6619 16.311 260.635 0.444 1.682 4.527 
 
 
We recommend caution when attempting to interpret these averages as many of these time 
series are unbalanced e.g. the bond yield data for France covers 1998 to 2018 while the bond yield 
data for Senegal is only for 2013 and 2014. We note that the measures of climate vulnerability 
NDS and NDC are higher for the V20 countries, and the measure of social readiness NDSR is 
lower. From this preliminary description of the data set, the question arises whether the observed 
difference in cost of capital can be explained by the chosen set of explanatory variables. 
Table 3:  Descriptive statistics: V20 countries 
 
 
 N Mean St Dev P25 P50 P75 
YIELD 174 10.307 6.586 6.200 7.975 12.660 
NDS 880 0.451 0.085 0.396 0.464 0.503 
NDC 924 0.629 0.124 0.530 0.635 0.730 
NDSR 990 0.230 0.084 0.172 0.214 0.274 
PCY 1563 1931 2617 421 958 2286 
DEBT 930 57.864 43.087 33.200 45.700 69.800 
REV 988 21.594 13.090 13.788 18.801 25.129 
EXP 985 25.002 14.051 17.015 22.198 28.746 
PBA 916 -1.329 4.427 -2.881 -1.061 0.886 
CPI 1459 28.914 316.806 2.900 6.300 11.800 
FDI 1564 2.732 3.977 0.341 1.325 3.894 
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The data on debt yields is not normally distributed, exhibiting positive skewness due to the 
large positive outliers shown in Figure 3. Accordingly, a log transformation is applied to ensure a 
symmetric distribution of the dependent variable 
Figure 3: Kernel density of nominal yields 
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6. Multivariate analysis 
 
Table 4 shows our initial regression model using POLS with robust standard errors. We present 
nominal yields in the descriptive statistics above, however as noted the multivariate analysis spec- 
ifies the natural logarithm of our annual bond yield observations as the dependent variable. 
Table 4: Determinants of log yields 
 
 [A] [B] [C] [D] 
NDS 1.106∗∗∗ 1.222∗∗∗ 1.068∗∗∗ 0.679∗ 
NDC 0.527 0.778∗ 0.399 0.176 
NDSR -1.605∗∗∗ -1.727∗∗∗ -1.624∗∗∗ -2.495∗∗∗ 
PCY 0.000∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗ -0.000 
DEBT -0.010∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗ -0.010∗∗∗ -0.010∗∗∗ 
REV -0.185∗∗∗ -0.172∗∗∗ -0.179∗∗∗ -0.168∗∗∗ 
EXP 0.182∗∗∗ 0.172∗∗∗ 0.177∗∗∗ 0.159∗∗∗ 
PBA 0.149∗∗∗ 0.140∗∗∗ 0.144∗∗∗ 0.112∗∗∗ 
CPI 0.006∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗ 
FDI 0.024∗ 0.026∗ 0.017 0.018 
IMF  -0.231∗ -0.264∗∗ -0.294∗∗∗ 
V20   0.203∗∗∗ 0.168∗∗ 
G7    0.974∗∗∗ 
aic 363.596 359.889 351.807 324.058 
bic 406.435 406.622 402.434 378.580 
Adjusted R2 0.738 0.741 0.748 0.767 
N 363 363 363 363 
All models refer to POLS using the Huber-White sandwich estimator. 
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001 
 
 
The explanatory power is satisfactory with an adjusted R-squared of approximately 75%. We 
observe a positive coefficient on our key climate sensitivity measure NDS, implying the possibility 
that higher sensitivity may be correlated with higher bond yields. This index includes measures 
such as food import dependency, slum population and dependency on imported energy. The coef- 
ficient on NDC is positive but generally not statistically significant. The negative and significant 
result on our NDSR measure of social readiness confirms the importance of investments in ICT 
infrastructure and education in reducing the cost of debt and mitigating the risks of climate change. 
The use of a per capita income PCY variable controls for the inherent correlation of many of these 
measures with gross domestic product. 
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We note the high degree of correlation between NDSR, NDS and NDC, leading to high variance 
inflation factors in excess of the critical value of 10. The matrix of correlation coefficients is 
presented in Appendix B. We observe that although the acronyms are ND-Sensitivity, ND-Capacity 
and ND-Social Readiness, sensitivity and capacity are in fact positively correlated at 0.611, while 
social readiness is negatively correlated with sensitivity at -0.515, and with capacity at -0.886. We 
suggest that although capacity includes measures such as dam capacity, its effect is to map out the 
relative paucity of such capacity. 
To address the multicollinearity inherent in our climate vulnerability indicators, we conduct a 
principal component analysis (PCA) of the NDS and NDC variables. Note that NDSR is a pre- 
paredness indicator. This statistical methodology allows us to reduce the the number of variables 
by formulating them as two uncorrelated linear combinations of the variables, the first of which 
contains the majority of the variance. 
Figure 4: Scree plot of Principal Component Analysis eigenvalues 
 
 
We determine the number of components appropriate to our model by using a scree plot as 
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shown in Figure 4. Eigenvalues are below one, after one component is considered, suggesting that 
a single component is sufficient. 
Table 5: Determinants of yields based on PCA 
 
 [A] [B] [C] [D] 
SCORE 0.146∗∗∗ 0.176∗∗∗ 0.135∗∗∗ 0.081∗ 
NDSR -1.557∗∗∗ -1.764∗∗∗ -1.541∗∗∗ -2.410∗∗∗ 
PCY 0.000∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗ -0.000 
DEBT -0.010∗∗∗ -0.010∗∗∗ -0.010∗∗∗ -0.010∗∗∗ 
REV -0.185∗∗∗ -0.171∗∗∗ -0.178∗∗∗ -0.168∗∗∗ 
EXP 0.182∗∗∗ 0.172∗∗∗ 0.178∗∗∗ 0.160∗∗∗ 
PBA 0.150∗∗∗ 0.140∗∗∗ 0.145∗∗∗ 0.112∗∗∗ 
CPI 0.006∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗ 
FDI 0.024∗ 0.026∗ 0.018 0.019 
IMF  -0.227∗∗ -0.271∗∗ -0.300∗∗∗ 
V20   0.197∗∗∗ 0.162∗∗ 
G7    0.974∗∗∗ 
aic 361.649 357.925 350.024 322.297 
bic 400.593 400.763 396.757 372.925 
Adjusted R2 0.739 0.742 0.748 0.767 
N 363 363 363 363 
All models refer to POLS using the Huber-White sandwich estimator. 
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001 
 
 
Based on the PCA model, we define our own climate vulnerability index (SCORE) based on 
the ND-GAIN sensitivity and capacity indices. Table 5 demonstrates that the SCORE variable 
has a positive and significant impact on yield - particularly after controlling for multilateral IMF 
debt yields, which are based on concessionary rates. We note that although country dummies are 
statistically significant, they are also subject to strong selection biases related to access to financial 
markets. In summary, our findings suggest that climate vulnerability has a positive impact on cost 
of debt, while developmental indicators reflected in the NDSR have a negative impact on the cost 
of debt. 
 
7. Estimated additional debt cost due to climate vulnerability 
 
Our estimate is based on statistics for external public, publicly guaranteed and private debt 
from the World Bank Development Indicator Databank, for 40 members of the V20 group of 
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climate vulnerable countries. The number of countries is determined by data availability. This 
figure totaled USD 768 billion in 2016 and USD 5.4 trillion over the ten year period 2007 to 2016. 
Estimated climate vulnerability impacts for V20 countries are shown in Table 6. The V20 countries 
included in the empirical model reflect 86% of the external debt reported by the World Bank for 
the wider V20 group. 
Table 6: V20 incremental debt yield estimates 
 
 
 mean p50 sd 
BASE 12.420 12.270 3.357 
CLIMATE 1.174 1.213 0.198 
PREPAREDNESS -0.674 -0.686 0.092 
 
Multiplying external debt by our estimated climate vulnerability impact of 1.17% (adjusted 
for log yields and the V20 average climate vulnerability SCORE) generates an estimate of ten year 
historical cost exceeding USD 62 billion. This estimate of direct effects connects with many related 
issues that are beyond the scope of this paper. External debt for this sample of V20 countries rose 
by over 5% in 2016. The percentage of equity to capital required typically increases with perceived 
risk (e.g. sovereign debt rating), which would be more of an issue in V20 countries as (1) equity 
is generally scarce in less developed, largely domestic financial systems and (2) any increase in 
equity can dramatically increase the weighted average cost of capital. Both the higher debt cost 
and increased equity requirements would logically decrease the universe of positive net present 
value investment opportunities relative to required hurdle rates. Similarly higher hurdle rates and 
worse sovereign credit ratings may decrease the supply of international private sector capital. 
To the extent that cost of debt limits investment in key sectors, it would then change the profile 
of such investment. This might potentially reflect a bias towards conventional investments over 
sustainable or climate resilient investments with higher initial capex requirements. 
 
8. Robustness checks 
 
In Table 7 we present three checks of robustness. Column 1 is the empirical result from above. 
Column 2 highlights how some controls have negatively impacted the number of observations, 
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specifically with respect to a number of V20 countries. In selecting our empirical model we have 
prioritized the number of observations. Model [C] in column 3 introduces a risk free rate RFR 
control based on US 10 year Treasury yields. The number of observations declines as the United 
States is no longer included in the model as observations of the dependent variable. 
Table 7: Robustness checks 
 
[A] [B] [C] [D] 
SCORE 0.176∗∗∗ 0.133∗∗∗ 0.168∗∗∗ 0.217∗∗∗ 
NDSR -1.764∗∗∗ -2.006∗∗∗ -1.891∗∗∗ -1.569∗∗∗ 
PCY 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 
DEBT -0.010∗∗∗ -0.005∗∗∗ -0.010∗∗∗ -0.010∗∗∗ 
REV -0.171∗∗∗  -0.159∗∗∗ -0.171∗∗∗ 
EXP 0.172∗∗∗  0.160∗∗∗ 0.172∗∗∗ 
PBA 0.140∗∗∗  0.115∗∗∗ 0.140∗∗∗ 
CPI 0.006∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗ 
FDI 0.026∗ 0.026∗ 0.022∗ 0.029∗ 
IMF -0.227∗∗ -0.483∗∗∗ -0.258∗∗  
RFR   0.331∗∗∗  
MAT    -0.264 
MAT 2    0.019 
aic 357.925 510.050 326.171 335.156 
bic 400.763 541.799 372.362 380.997 
Adjusted R2 0.742 0.620 0.758 0.753 
N 363 391 347 337 
All models refer to POLS using the Huber-White sandwich estimator. 
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001 
 
 
In column 4 we address the differences in maturity by introducing a polynomial of the maturity. 
Because the cost of debt data is limited for many countries of our sample group, and many choose 
to issue bonds primarily at maturities other than ten years, we have chosen the most comprehensive 
time series available for each. Maturities vary from 5 years, 8 years, 9 years, 10 years and 20 years, 
with 10 years being the most common. This is a non-optimal way to address differences in maturity 
as it estimates a yield curve assuming that there is a universal yield curve which is unlikely to exist. 
Bond yield observations on IMF concessionary debt is not included in model [D] as their maturity 
is undefined in the data. 
These robustness checks confirm the original result of a positive and statistically    significant 
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coefficient on the climate vulnerability measure SCORE and a negative and statistically significant 
coefficient on the social readiness measure NDSR, at the 99.9% significance level. 
 
9. Sample selection bias 
 
Thus far, our empirical model focuses on countries for which yield data is observable and 
available via the data provider Bloomberg. This implies that our regression analysis operates under 
the condition that countries can issue sovereign bonds (and that debt issues are of sufficient size 
and liquidity to warrant recording by Bloomberg).  This is not the case for all V20 countries.  
Our POLS model is valid as a second-stage model. Hence we determine the conditional expected 
value of bond yields influenced by climate vulnerability and other factors under the condition  
that countries have access to capital markets. The first-stage problem becomes understanding the 
underlying factors that enable countries to issue bonds. In this selection stage, climate vulnerability 
and other control variables might play another role. Accordingly, there is a possibility that climate 
vulnerability reduces a country’s access to capital markets, in addition to the direct yield effect 
analyzed earlier. 
 
9.1.  Logistic model of exclusion from capital markets 
 
Table 8 shows our results based on a logistic regression, where access to capital markets, prox- 
ied as having observable sovereign bond yields, is the dependent variable. Specification [S1] fo- 
cuses on climate vulnerability exclusively, indicating a pseudo R-squared of 0.163, relatively high 
for a single explanatory variable. Model [S2] includes all controls used in the first-stage model 
and a V20 country dummy, showing a general group-specific disadvantage in accessing capital 
markets. Both specifications reveal that climate vulnerability, yet again, affects V20 countries 
negatively. The likelihood of being excluded (coded as one) increases with climate vulnerability 
throughout all specifications. Moreover, investments in social and physical infrastructure (NDSR) 
can reduce the likelihood of exclusion.  This effect is even stronger for V20 countries as shown  
in model [S3] as the interaction term is highly significant; in fact, the sign of the variable  NDSR 
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Table 8: Predicting exclusion from capital markets 
 
 [S1] [S2] [S3] [S4] 
EXC     
SCORE 0.869∗∗∗ 0.909∗∗∗ 0.928∗∗∗ 0.299∗∗ 
NDSR  -6.687∗ 123.226∗∗ -7.735∗∗∗ 
PCY  0.000∗ 0.000∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ 
DEBT  0.032∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 
REV  0.132 0.140 0.217∗∗∗ 
EXP  -0.100 -0.109 -0.153∗∗ 
PBA  -0.008 -0.017 -0.069 
CPI  -0.000 -0.001 0.007 
FDI  0.108∗ 0.108∗ 0.129∗∗∗ 
V20  15.537∗∗ 103.708∗∗  
NDSRxV20   -130.176∗∗  
aic 1322.908 512.686 513.032 918.635 
bic 1333.197 564.380 569.426 967.802 
Pseudo R2 0.163 0.561 0.562 0.318 
N 1267 812 812 1009 
All models refer to POLS using the Huber-White sandwich estimator. 
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001 
 
 
switches from negative to positive. As a check of robustness, model [S4] excludes dummies and 
the interaction term, confirming prior findings for all countries. 
We use specification [S3], with the highest pseudo R-squared of about 56%, as our reference 
model. To illustrate the impact of climate vulnerability, it would be more appropriate to use model 
[S4]. Figure 5 plots the predicted probability of facing difficulties in raising capital from debt 
markets, differentiating the sample countries between membership in the V20 group, and members 
of the G7 or G24. A clear pattern emerges in that V20 countries, after controlling for all other 
factors, exhibit a high risk of exclusion, and climate vulnerability makes access to capital markets 
even more of a challenge. Each dot represents a country-year, and the estimated probability that 





























Figure 5: Predicted probability for exclusion 
 
This paper fills an important gap in knowledge by investigating the impact of climate vulnera- 
bility on sovereign bond yields. It provides early evidence that measures of climate vulnerability 
have a positive impact on the cost of sovereign debt. This statistically significant result highlights 
one channel of financial cost that the V20 climate-vulnerable countries bear because of their higher 
exposure to vulnerabilities such as higher dependency on natural capital or greater water depen- 
dency ratio. We estimate the debt cost due to higher climate vulnerability to have exceeded USD 62 
billion over the last ten years. Our logistic model indicates a negative correlation between climate 
vulnerability and ability to raise capital in size. All these results are after controlling for conven- 
tional macroeconomic and fiscal drivers of the cost of debt. Our results also draw attention to how 
the adverse impact of climate vulnerability can be mitigated by investment in ICT infrastructure, 
education and health for those countries which are most at need. 
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Future directions of this work could examine the interrelation between rating changes, bond 
yields and climate vulnerability using a qualitative short panel vector auto-regression model.  
This could reveal whether ratings drive markets or vice versa. Secondly,  it would be interest-  
ing to explore direct and indirect effects of climate vulnerability using a structural equation model. 
This could help to determine whether climate vulnerability acts directly or indirectly by affecting 
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Appendix A.  Table of variables 
 
 
Variable Source Definition 
YIELD Bloomberg Up to weekly Sovereign Bond yield observations collected on 46 countries to estimate an 
annual bond yield. For liquid markets this would be 52 observations of generic benchmark 
yields as calculated by Bloomberg. For other markets this might reflect the average yield 
at a debt auction. IMF bonds are discussed below. Clean or dirty (including accrued 
coupons) pricing is used based on market convention.  Local currency bonds are  chosen 





The ND-GAIN Sensitivity index consists of 12 measures including: Food import de- 
pendency, rural population, fresh water withdrawal rate, water dependency ratio, slum 
population, dependency on external resource for health services, dependency on natural 
capital, ecological footprint, urban concentration, age dependency ratio, dependency on 
imported energy, and population living under 5m above sea level.  Statistics are  rebased 





The ND-GAIN capacity index consists of 12 measures including: agriculture capacity 
(fertilizer, irrigation, pesticide, tractor use), child malnutrition, access to reliable drink- 
ing water, dam capacity, medical staff, access to improved sanitation, protected biomes, 
engagement in international environmental conventions, quality of trade and transport re- 





Variable Source Definition 
SCORE PCA of NDS 
and NDC 
Principal Component Analysis (PCA) is a mathematical tool that generates orthogonal 
linear combinations, in this case of our NDS and NDC indices, with the majority of   the 





The ND-GAIN Social Readiness index is based on four indicators. The social inequality 
measure is the poorest quintile’s share in national income or consumption. The indicator 
for information and communications technology is made up of percent of individuals: us- 
ing the Internet, with mobile phone subscriptions, with fixed phone subscriptions and with 
fixed broadband subscriptions. Education is measured by enrollment in tertiary education 
as a percentage of gross. Innovation is estimated by patents per capita. 
CRI Germanwatch The Climate Risk Index analyses to what extent countries have been affected by the im- 
pacts of weather-related loss events (storms, floods, heatwaves etc.)  We utilize the short 
term i.e. annual index, for the period 2006 to 2016. 
PCY IMF WEO Per capita income is GDP per capita at purchasing power parity in US dollars. 
DEBT IMF WEO Gross government debt to GDP. 
REV IMF FM and 
PFMH 
Government revenues to GDP. 
EXP IMF FM and 
PFMH 





Variable Source Definition 
PBA IMF FM and 
PFMH 
Primary balance to GDP. 
CPI IMF FM and 
PFMH 
Change in end of period consumer price index. 
FDI UNCTAD Foreign Direct Investment to GDP. 
V20 UNEP Statistical dummy used to identify members of the V20 group of environmentally vulner- 
able countries. 
G7 G7 Statistical dummy used to identify members of the G7 group of major economies. 
IMF IMF Statistical dummy used to identify IMF bonds under concessional lending programmes. 
For example Vanuatu’s public external debt is mostly concessional (17.9% of GDP) and 
contracted from multilateral lenders such as the IMF, EIB, WB-IDA and ADB, or via 
bilateral agreements such as with China Ex-Im Bank. Typically the nominal interest rates 
of these instruments are fairly low and with long maturities over 20 years. 






Appendix B.  Matrix of correlation coefficients 
 




 YIELD NDS NDC NDSR PCY DEBT REV EXP PBA CPI FDI 
YIELD 1         
NDS 0.367∗∗∗ 1        
NDC 0.664∗∗∗ 0.611∗∗∗ 1       
NDSR -0.726∗∗∗ -0.515∗∗∗ -0.886∗∗∗ 1      
PCY -0.698∗∗∗ -0.568∗∗∗ -0.835∗∗∗ 0.930∗∗∗ 1     
DEBT -0.608∗∗∗ -0.0590 -0.579∗∗∗ 0.577∗∗∗ 0.582∗∗∗ 1    
REV -0.567∗∗∗ -0.625∗∗∗ -0.825∗∗∗ 0.794∗∗∗ 0.787∗∗∗ 0.402∗∗∗ 1   
EXP -0.517∗∗∗ -0.569∗∗∗ -0.824∗∗∗ 0.796∗∗∗ 0.788∗∗∗ 0.495∗∗∗ 0.954∗∗∗ 1  
PBA -0.0472 -0.199∗∗∗ -0.0684 -0.0195 -0.0314 -0.208∗∗∗ 0.223∗∗∗ -0.0432 1 
CPI 0.299∗∗∗ 0.00332 0.105∗ -0.150∗∗ -0.169∗∗ -0.146∗∗ -0.176∗∗∗ -0.0602 -0.406∗∗∗ 1 
FDI 0.204∗∗∗ -0.00639 0.0982 -0.183∗∗∗ -0.156∗∗ -0.227∗∗∗ -0.0265 -0.0554 0.0943 -0.0496 1 




 Appendix C. Countries included in panel ordinary least squares regression model 
 
 
Source: Compiled with data from Bloomberg and the World Bank. Multilateral debt is typically at concessionary 
rates. Total external debt consists of public, publicly-guaranteed, private non-guaranteed and IMF credit 
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